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In 1910 Cleveland was one of the engine rooms of American industrial growth, positioned on the southern shore of Lake Erie with easy access to eastern markets, Appalachian coal, Great Lakes shipping, and the industrial power houses of Detroit and Chicago to the west and New York to the east. The Westing house Corporation and the Brush Electrical Company were born in Cleveland and still maintained large plants there. About half of the city's workforce was employed in manufacturing jobs concentrated in its fi ve key industries: steelmaking and foundries, metal working, industrial and commercial machinery, electrical goods, and automobile components. Propelled by its industrial strength, and bolstered by its status as the largest city between Chicago and New York, Cleveland had a strong
Changing Roles c h a p t e r 3 fi nancial and legal community, an active Chamber of Commerce, and busy railroad connections to Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Boston, and New York. In 1912 it was in its glory days, still two generations removed from its later sobriquet as the "mistake on the lake" and the epicenter of the rust belt that blighted the industrial Midwest at the end of the twentieth century. 2 Between 1825 and 1930 Cleveland developed in four phases of municipal government. At fi rst it was run by a Merchant Regime, dominated by the business organizations created by its found ers. After 1878, in response to pressures generated by industrialization, immigration, and rapid growth, a Populist Regime ran the city until the end of the nineteenth century. Its failure to deliver ser vices to Cleveland's industrial workforce led to its replacement by Tom Johnson and the Corporate Regime. City governments led by Johnson, Baehr, and Baker proved better able to deliver ser vices to Clevelanders than their pre de ces sors, but they largely ignored the demands of the automobile age and the need to attract new industries. After 1920 a new Realty Regime, staffed by businessmen and affi liated with the city's main industrial concerns, emphasized road building and infrastructure projects until its demise in the Great Depression. Baker's fi ve terms as city solicitor and two as mayor between 1902 and 1916 placed him at the heart of the Corporate Regime. Although he was proud to be known as Johnson's protégé, Baker brought more than emulation to his mayoralty. He was more pragmatic than his mentor; his commitment to municipal own ership of utilities sprang from his concern about high prices and poor ser vice rather than from adherence to Henry George's theories. As Johnson had portrayed himself as the scourge of "the interests," Baker was content to be known as the "three cent mayor," providing 3 cent streetcar fares, electricity, municipal dances, fi sh, and ice cream. In so doing he pushed the idea of municipal own ership much further than Johnson had dared and without his pre de ces sor's infl amed rhetoric. Baker advocated "civitism," his own term that emphasized quality of life issues and Clevelanders' emotional attachment to their cultural environment. His style was also more inclusive than Johnson's. He was careful to work with business groups rather than against them, and he remained a member of the Chamber of Commerce until the beginning of 1914, when he resigned after it opposed him over a municipal fi nance bill. Even then he retained his stock in the Chamber and promised to reapply for membership upon the expiration of his term as mayor. 4 Baker's conciliatory approach was gradual and incomplete; his municipal own ership policies often set him against Cleveland's business sector, and he remained closer to the city's intellectual and professional groups than to its entrepreneurial and corporate interests. Business groups never accepted municipal own ership, but they appreciated Baker's less confrontational style as a welcome break from the bitter controversies of the Johnson years. 5 Baker's blunting of Johnson's sharp edges marked him as a new type of Democratic leader. Governor Judson Harmon in Ohio, Mayor John Purroy Mitchel in New York City, and Governor Woodrow Wilson in New Jersey, all elected between 1909 and 1913, promised to work with reformers, po liti cal organizations, and business groups to achieve reform. "The temper of the Demo cratic Party in 1910," the Cleveland Plain Dealer noted, "is not radical. It is sanely progressive." Baker was an example of this new Demo crat who "has . . . broken away from the wild-eyed radicalism and the desire for complete upsetting and unsettling." Like Harmon, Mitchel, and Wilson, Baker worked to integrate expertise in social reform and administration-in Baker's case from Cleveland's Western Reserve University, private charities, and professional groups-with the Demo cratic or ga ni za tion to conduct city government and defuse tensions that had long plagued relations between these groups. 6 The offi ce to which Baker was elected in 1911 was busy and varied. At the beginning of 1914, after a reor ga ni za tion of the city's government, he described his duties as a combination of the formal and the informal. As mayor, he appointed the heads of the six administrative departments of Ser vice, Safety, Welfare, Law, Finance, and Utilities. He was also the chief executive of Cleveland, responsible for seeing that the laws of the United States, the laws of the state of Ohio, and the ordinances of the Cleveland Municipal Council were enforced. Alongside these formal duties Cleveland's mayor was the spokesman for the city and "to some extent at least a leader of public opinion in the community": "He is called upon to visit the sick, bury the dead, marry the living, welcome visiting delegations of all sorts, participate in benevolent, philanthropic, social, and po liti cal activities, and, by speeches on every conceivable subject, to encourage right thinking, right living, and higher ideals." 7 And then there was the drudgery. Patronage was the lifeblood of politics in the fi rst half of the twentieth century, and Cleveland was no exception. When Baker became mayor his fi rst task was to fi ll the large number of jobs within his gift. Acting on recommendations from party leaders, and responding to hundreds of letters seeking employment, he devoted his fi rst months in offi ce to selecting heads of his executive departments, accepting resignations from Baehr's appointees, renewing those he wanted to continue, and fi lling hundreds of positions left vacant. The range of these positions was bewildering, from skilled and well-paid jobs such as engineering draftsman in the Parks Department paying $1,200 per year to meter readers in the Water Department, clerks in the Street Repair Department, paving foremen, and rodmen in the Engineering Department. At least fi ve hundred jobs had to be fi lled, and Baker had to sign each letter of appointment. Although he believed deeply in the party system, he became a fervent proponent of civil ser vice reform and its replacement of the spoils system by merit-based appointments. He had more important duties to perform than hiring and fi ring hundreds of municipal workers simply because he and the Demo crats were now in charge. 8 Baker's time as mayor saw signifi cant additions to Cleveland's infrastructure as it struggled to accommodate rapidly growing population. The streetcar system received more cars and new lines; a new City Hall was constructed, a Union Station erected, and lakefront docks built. Baker hired more offi cers for the Police and Fire Departments and installed a new water main in the downtown district. A new tuberculosis sanitarium, an expanded insane asylum, and an enlarged work house for prisoners and the indigent updated Cleveland's ability to care for its sick, criminals, and poor. The city also began to replace its sewage system, which discharged raw effl uent into Lake Erie, with one that sent it inland to the Cuyahoga valley, continued road paving programs, and instituted biweekly garbage collection from all its homes. This record of achievement was impressive, and comparable to any two terms of Johnson's more storied administration. In 1993 a survey of American mayors ranked Baker, who served only two terms, eigh teenth out of all American mayors who had held offi ce between 1820 and 1990. Tom Johnson, who served four terms, ranked second. Baker's po liti cal and personal style allowed him to justify new measures in less threatening language than Johnson had used, and he exuded a combination of intellect and warmth that many Clevelanders found attractive. His record was not perfect; his anti-vice campaign proved embarrassing when the chief of police was found in a compromising position, improvement of the sewage system proceeded too slowly, and his preference for bond issues over taxation to fund improvements left the city with debts that consumed a third of its revenues by 1915.
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Baker sought re-election as mayor in November 1913. By then Cleveland had a new charter and a nonpartisan preferential electoral system. This seems to have depressed Baker's vote below his 1911 majority of 18,000. With Baker's name stripped of party identifi cation, many immigrant voters found it diffi cult to fi nd him on the ballot. Although he beat his opponent Harry L. Davis by more than fi ve thousand votes on fi rst preferences, Baker was forced to count second-preference votes to get a majority of votes. His fi nal majority in 1913 was 3,258, made up by large numbers of normally Republican voters who helped to offset defections from Baker's old immigrant base. "Am perfectly delighted with your reelection," McAdoo cabled from Washington. "It is a great triumph deservedly won."
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Baker's fi rst major policy task was to win municipal home rule. Under the 1902 Ohio Municipal Code all cities-large and small, industrial and rural-were or ga-nized on a single template with elected offi ce holders, municipal councils, and tight control by the state over city police powers, bond issues, and taxation. By the end of the de cade many of Ohio's cities found this regime too restrictive. Small cities found the structure of elected councils, mayors, and other offi cers too cumbersome; larger cities such as Cleveland and Toledo chafed under state control over their bond issues and police regulations. Baker felt these constraints keenly; a "bush-beating expedition into the remote regions of southern Ohio" in 1914 showed him that "nobody who has ever seen Cleveland would believe that in the same state there could be so widely different and so completely rural a civilization." 12 Tom Johnson and Newton Baker led the demand for an amendment to the state constitution to allow cities to opt out of the Code and formulate their own charters. Baker worked closely with his fellow mayor Brand Whitlock of Toledo to push home rule, under which the state retained its general policing and taxation powers but cities were freer to devise ordinances suited to their own conditions without fear of veto from Columbus. Baker was president of the Ohio Municipal League and then chairman of the Ohio conference of cities in 1912 that agreed on a constitutional amendment to be put to the people.
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Home rule was controversial. State legislators from rural areas hesitated to cede more power to cities, utilities opposed it as a license for municipal own ership, and prohibitionists worried that Cincinnati and Cleveland might undermine Ohio's dry laws. Led by Baker and Whitlock, however, home rule passed by more than 80,000 votes. Baker then created a Charter Commission to frame Cleveland's new government. The commission chose a mayor-council structure that placed executive functions under the mayor and legislative powers under the council. Other elected offi ces, such as city solicitor, were abolished, and municipal boards of health and public safety were replaced by departments under the mayor's control. The charter passed easily in a citywide vote in 1913.
14 As he worked to win home rule, Baker made good his promise to build a municipally owned electric power plant. In this he both echoed and modifi ed Johnson's legacy. Johnson had long told Clevelanders that, once the streetcars had been municipalized, electric power generation would be next. Baker endorsed this goal but was careful to modify its rationale. Whereas Johnson had argued for municipal power generation from the principle that private utility monopolies corrupted good government, Baker argued from a more pragmatic premise. The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEIC), he told Clevelanders, abused its monopoly by charging them up to 10 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh), but only 0.74 cent to large commercial customers. Because the CEIC refused to reduce prices to domestic consumers, Baker argued that a municipally owned plant, selling power at 3 cents per kWh, would reduce their electricity prices.
Baker emphasized the pragmatic nature of his municipal power plans. His crusade was for cheaper electricity, not to abolish private own ership of utilities. "I believe that a private company engaged in the public ser vice should be protected in its real investment and permitted to make a fair return thereon," he declared during the mayoral campaign of 1911. Much later, in a statement to the Republican leader Henry Stimson, Baker restated the limits of his enthusiasm for public own ership of utilities. Wherever a ser vice was eco nom ical ly and fairly provided by private enterprise, municipalization was "either unnecessary or premature." Municipalities should act only when private utilities abused their market power or performed inadequately. That judgment should be left to each city rather than to state authorities; public own ership was a powerful weapon that should only be deployed at a local level to remedy bad behavior by private operators.
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In keeping with these ideas Baker's fi rst move to municipal power generation was to offer to buy the CEIC's properties for their market value. Although voters had approved a bond issue to build their own municipal power station, he told the CEIC in January 1912, they wanted to avoid the acrimony, wasteful competition, and litigation that had marked the streetcar battles of 1902-1909. The CEIC declined his offer, leaving Baker with his original plan to create a separate municipal electric power plant to break the CEIC's monopoly.
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Cleveland had already acquired municipal power stations through its annexation of the townships of Collinwood and South Brooklyn. Both townships had operated small power plants, but their size and location made them unsuitable for generating Cleveland's power. Baker planned to use the $2 million bond issue authorized in 1911 to build a large power plant in downtown Cleveland, where it would be close to fresh water and rail lines. The Collinwood and South Brooklyn plants would act as substations, and together the three plants could generate large amounts of power. The new municipal plant, with a capacity of 20,000 kW, opened in 1914 and sold power at 3 cents per kWh.
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The new plant was an immediate success, covering its costs and forcing the CEIC to drop its rates. Baker claimed a triple benefi t: the city saved money by powering its streetlights and streetcars from the cheaper municipal plant, consumers saved money, and the CEIC's customers benefi ted from the decline in its charges. Baker calculated in 1915 that the CEIC's customers had saved $800,000 since the municipal plant had opened in 1914, and in 1925 he estimated that all Cleveland consumers had saved almost $14 million over the previous eleven years. The municipal yardstick had worked exactly as he had hoped.
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Baker claimed other benefi ts from the municipal electricity plant. Under pressure from the city plant's 3 cent rate, the CEIC voluntarily submitted to price regulation by the Ohio Public Ser vice Commission (OPSC). This was to circumvent a Cleveland ordinance limiting private utilities to a maximum price of 3 cents per kWh. Although the OPSC held that the CEIC could charge a maximum of 5 cents per kWh, Baker still claimed victory. Given that the CEIC had originally claimed to be in possession of a perpetual grant to sell electric power and that it was not subject to any regulatory authority at all, Baker argued that municipal power had not only lowered rates but also forced a powerful corporation to subject itself to regulation. Competition had transformed the CEIC into a model corporate citizen; in 1925 Baker described it as "one of the best managed public utilities with which I have any acquaintance." 20 Cleveland's "three cent mayor" built on these initiatives to experiment with municipal intervention in other aspects of the city's life. In 1913 he announced that Cleveland would build a "model suburb" on one hundred acres of land. The suburb would have ample space for playgrounds and its fi ve hundred houses would each be set on blocks big enough for front and back gardens. Workers from the nearby American Steel and Wire Company plant would be offered houses at rents from $4 to $12 dollars a month, and they would run the suburb through a residents' corporation. Baker hailed this project, which was inspired by Letchworth Garden City in En gland and Hellerau in Germany, as a way to improve Cleveland's housing stock and generate profi ts for other city projects. Land developers were less pleased and managed to scuttle the project. "If a municipality is to take away legitimate profi t from real estate dealers," the secretary of the Cleveland Real Estate Board wondered, "what private business is there which is to be safe from ruinous municipal competition?"
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When Baker did extend municipal own ership and operation, it was on a smaller scale. In the summer of 1912 the price of fi sh caught from Lake Erie rose to exorbitant levels. The city created a Municipal Fish Company to catch and sell fi sh at 3 cents per pound to compete with the private market's average of 12 cents. Prices soon fell to around 3 cents, but Baker declined to continue his experiment. "The matter was done really by private enterprise rather than by the City," he wrote disingenuously at the end of 1912, "and the whole experiment was too tentative to be the basis of any philosophy on the subject." He did undertake a similar scheme in city parks, where private concession stands sold ice cream at high prices. The city set up its own stands that made profi ts of more than $20,000 in 1914.
22
Attempts to improve Cleveland's dance halls combined Baker's desire to provide cheaper and better ser vices with his goal to improve the city's moral environment. The halls, magnets for young men and women, were largely unsupervised and poorly lit. They opened early, closed late, and were, Baker thought, hotbeds of vice. They charged 5 cents for a three-minute dance, which to him seemed extortionate. At fi rst he tried regulation, stationing a police offi cer in each hall to ensure that the dancers did not dance too closely or fall into the arms of pimps and other criminals.
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The private dance halls did improve, but they were still expensive. Baker then moved, as he had done with electricity, fi sh sales, and park refreshments, to provide wholesome competition through municipalization. The city erected two large pavilions in its lakeside parks and operated halls that charged 3 cents for a fi ve-minute dance. The pavilions were well lit and supervised by city employees on the lookout for untoward behavior. That behavior included par tic u lar styles of dance (Baker objected to the tango, for example, which brought partners too close together). Girls younger than 18, unless they were accompanied by an older male relative, were forbidden entry after 9:00 p.m. The municipal dance halls were a great success; in 1914 they earned revenues of $19,000 and a profi t of $5,000.
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Baker's dance hall reforms aimed to improve recreation for Cleveland's working class, and in 1913 he created more entertainment for it by establishing the Cleveland Municipal Orchestra (CMO) to provide "wholesome and elevating entertainment" on winter Sunday afternoons. For a modest admission fee the CMO played to audiences of two thousand "principally young men and young women engaged in industrial commerce, living in down town boarding houses." Saloons were closed on Sundays, and the dance halls were snowed in, so the CMO fi lled the void and tried to elevate the cultural interests of Cleveland's young people. Financial stringencies in 1915 forced the city to discontinue its subsidies to the CMO, but it was kept alive by private philanthropy.
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Baker's excursions into municipal own ership were eye-catching but cautious. Municipal streetcars were an inheritance from Johnson, and the power plant was justifi ed in economic rather than ideological terms. The model suburb was cloaked in the language of sensible use of surplus public land and not in the rhetoric of socialized housing. Municipal ice cream, dance halls, and fi sh sales focused on the need to provide monopolies with price and ser vice competition, and their lifespan was determined more by their success in solving these problems than by the depth of Baker's commitment to them. He defended all these initiatives but was reluctant to extend them without good cause. When a constituent suggested that the city develop its ice plant into a full-scale retail operation, Baker refused. He was not convinced that the fi rm that supplied ice had abused its market power, and thought it wiser to wait to see how well municipal operation of other concerns worked. Baker's reluctance to extend municipal power became most obvious during the economic slump that struck in 1914. Eu ro pe an markets and fi nancial networks were disrupted by the outbreak of war in August 1914, leading to unemployment and a credit squeeze in the United States. As the home of hundreds of thousands of industrial workers, Cleveland was hit hard, and by November 1914 more than 60,000 of its workers had been laid off. This raised the issue of the city government's responsibility for alleviating the economic distress of its citizens. Municipal revenues were also crimped by the slump, and Baker cut expendituresincluding funding for the CMO-wherever possible. Cleveland already maintained a welfare system in the form of a work house and infi rmary, but Baker resisted calls to expand its scope to cope with the recession. He did bring forward an excavation project bud geted for 1915 but refused to establish a municipal public works program. He chose instead to rely on a Citizens' Relief Commission that was funded by wealthy Clevelanders. The commission raised nearly $90,000 and offered some of the unemployed work for 25 hours a week at 17 cents an hour. This was a start, but it was inadequate in the face of the destitution that stalked Cleveland's industrial neighborhoods.
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In an exchange with the chairman of the Citizens' Relief Commission Baker accepted the proposition that destitution created "a community and social obligation" to help, but denied that it created a government obligation to do so. The charter created municipal government for "quite defi nitely stated objects," including public security, sanitation, amenities, and health, "within the limits of taxation." Public works to offset unemployment might one day be seen as a proper object of city government, but they drained precious revenue from the city's coffers. "I cannot persuade myself that with the city running far behind in its ordinary operating expenses, economizing at every point, and likely to end the year even more deeply in debt . . . the Mayor and the Council have any right to borrow in anticipation of next year's revenues for the assumption of this community burden not contemplated by law." 28 Baker adopted similar reasoning during the much greater economic depression twenty years later. His confl ation of fi scal rectitude and strict construction of the city charter to deny public relief for the unemployed suggested that his belief in municipal activism depended more on its prospects of reducing prices and improving ser vices than a commitment to relieve the economic suffering of citizens. Clevelanders found that their government could sell them electricity and ice cream, and run their dance halls, because those activities did not drain municipal fi nances. They could not, however, expect relief during a depression because that was a drain on the city trea sury. Baker's nickname as Cleveland's "three cent mayor" thus assumed a sharper edge during the slump of 1914-1915. Baker's innovations in city amenities did not extend to less respectable recreations. Although he was no prohibitionist, he enforced closure of saloons on Sundays and banned alcohol from municipal dance halls. He was also careful to avoid identifi cation with saloonkeepers by emphasizing the need for saloons to operate legally and responsibly within city and state liquor laws. It was vital for the "better men in that business to raise the standard of the traffi c and to eradicate the evils which result from the bad type of saloon, rather than by a wholesale crusade upon the entire business." Cleveland's 1,400 saloons contributed $1 million a year in city taxes. City ordinances and state laws regulating them must be observed, Baker declared, and they would be enforced. Yet their object would be to mitigate drunkenness without trying to abolish it.
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Brothels received harsher treatment. Johnson had tolerated Cleveland's red light district during his years as mayor; as long as prostitutes did not solicit in the streets, and brothels did not sell or provide alcohol, they and their clients were left alone. In 1912 there were perhaps three hundred "disorderly houses" in Cleveland, and Baker was determined to take a harder line. In 1914 he told police to close all the brothels they could fi nd in the "segregated district," and afterward claimed that only thirty brothels and three hundred prostitutes remained. Baker recognized that this forced prostitution underground, but maintained that this was the lesser of two evils. Brothels were magnets for criminals, while "the clandestine prostitute is ordinarily a far more cleanly [sic] and respectable victim." All that could be done was to eliminate "prostitution in its most brutal form"-on the streets and in brothels-and wait for growing enlightenment on the dangers of syphilis and the degrading effects of commercialized sex to suppress its market. Beyond that Baker would not go; he particularly objected to "any policy of enforcement which looks to the arresting of women and the excusing of men."
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Baker's anti-vice campaign was controversial. His decision to close the red light district was opposed by saloonkeepers and others who feared that prostitution would diffuse through the city once it was expelled from its traditional home. Cleaning up Cleveland even cost the chief of police, Frederick Kohler, his job. Kohler had run the campaign against prostitution during the fi rst year of Baker's mayoralty, but at the beginning of 1913 he was named as a third party in a divorce action through his adulterous affair with the wife of a Cleveland businessman. In dismissing him from offi ce, Baker charged Kohler with "conduct unbecoming an offi cer and a gentleman" and "gross immorality."
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As the mayor of one of the largest cities in the nation and successor to the celebrated Tom Johnson, Baker enjoyed a growing reputation as a progressive Democrat after 1912. He was a strong supporter of female suffrage and direct election of US senators to bring the national government closer to the pop u lar will and farther from "the economic inequalities of law-made favoritism." Baker was also a keen supporter of initiative and referendum, two other darlings of progressive reform. Initiative, through which the state legislature could be forced to consider measures upon petition by 10 percent of voters, and referendum-allowing voters to pass judgment on bills passed by the state legislature upon petition from 6 percent of the electorate-had been endorsed by the Ohio Demo cratic platforms of 1909 and 1911. Baker recognized that these mea sures were "merely pieces of po liti cal machinery," but believed that "a man's attitude to [them] is about the best index to his general attitude on Demo cratic questions that is afforded by any issue now before the people." Ohio Governor Judson Harmon, who had twice been elected on platforms promising initiative and referendum but now opposed their enactment, failed this test. Harmon was "honest, fi rm, but po liti cally unintelligent . . . I should not look forward to his election as President as at all a sign of promise or progress." 32 Baker's estimation of Harmon's presidential timber in February 1912 was indicative of his growing interest in national politics. Although he took time to choose between the contenders for the Demo cratic nomination, he was clear on one point: the prospect of Theodore Roo se velt running again was extremely worrying. As TR became po liti cally active at the beginning of 1912, Baker grew more agitated. Roo se velt's support of judicial recall-which allowed state legislatures to reverse court decisions that legislation was unconstitutional-seemed to Baker grossly irresponsible. Ever the lawyer, he could not conceive of untrained voters being let loose on legal pre ce dent and reasoning. "My opinion of Roo se velt," he wrote to his brother Frank at the beginning of March 1912, "grows gradually worse. I had not thought that possible." He also objected to TR's "utter lack of truthfulness . . . his behavior in the Panama business shows a reckless immorality . . . that makes him untrustworthy, if not dangerous." By the middle of 1912 Baker's views had hardened still more: "I think he is manifestly insane and will undoubtedly die in restraint, if not in a straight-jacket." 33 Baker was more circumspect about other Demo cratic candidates. He rejected Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives and front runner for the nomination, because he drank too much and spoke too indiscreetly. William Jennings Bryan could offer the party only a repeat of his defeats in 1896, 1900, and 1908. Harmon's hopes presented more complicated issues. Baker had already dismissed Harmon as too conservative, but as governor he would probably control the Ohio delegation to the convention. Baker was initially cool to Woodrow Wilson, who had emerged as another candidate for the nomination. Baker remembered Wilson from his days at Johns Hopkins, but he was cautious about his ability to win the nomination. Although Baker declared in September 1911 that Wilson possessed the ideas and conviction that Harmon lacked, he worried about the depth of Wilson's commitment to reform. The governor of New Jersey was "a pretty recent radical," and his academic work revealed a "conservative stiffness" that marked him as more conservative than his more recent utterances suggested.
Baker's doubts about Wilson persisted through the early months of 1912. He had heard Wilson criticize progressive reforms in terms that "I don't like now and didn't like then," and his writings showed signs of anti-Catholicism and a "somewhat hasty generalization about the desirability of immigrants from South Eu rope an countries." If those views became widely known, they would alienate two large Demo cratic constituencies. Wilson's later utterances, however, and his record as governor of New Jersey, showed that he could rise above his prejudices and conservatism, and he remained the most impressive Demo cratic contender for the nomination. "I suppose the fact is that pretty nearly every man who is of age, has made a fool of himself a few times in his life anyhow, and if that is to be a disqualifi cation for holding high public offi ce we had probably better nominate the Mummy of Rameses." Now convinced that Wilson's conversion to progressivism was genuine, Baker announced his support for him in March 1912, joined him on a speaking tour in Massachusetts in April, and led the pro-Wilson and anti-Harmon movement in Ohio.
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In the Ohio Primary Harmon won 52 percent of the vote to Wilson's 46 percent. His supporters then tried to impose the unit rule to force all Ohio's delegates to vote for him. This affected Baker personally, for he had won election as a Wilson delegate and had no intention of voting for Harmon. He lost that fi ght at the state convention, but fought it again at the national convention in Baltimore. In this he sought to overturn sixty years of party practice, which had always respected decisions by state conventions on the unit rule. The Committee on Rules at Baltimore followed tradition, so Baker and his allies argued their case on the convention fl oor. He told the delegates that to be forced to vote for Harmon would be a betrayal of his voters. A majority of delegates agreed, the committee's decision was overturned, and Wilson counted nineteen more delegates toward his cause. Baker's success won Wilson a crucial battle and gained the Clevelander national attention. City in the Fourth District, which took in Ohio, eastern Kentucky, and western Pennsylvania. He traveled to Washington to put Cleveland's case directly to McAdoo, and was delighted when his city was chosen over Cincinnati. Later that year Baker was so concerned by rumors that Cleveland's Bank would be relocated to Pittsburgh that he sought reassurance from McAdoo that his city was safe. McAdoo obliged and confi rmed Baker's judgment that his relations with McAdoo were "closer and more personal" than with any other member of Wilson's cabinet.
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Events in Eu rope soon put these matters into perspective. Baker was saddened but not surprised when war broke out in August 1914. All the major powers knew that war was coming, and all were party to its preparation. Although he condemned Germany for its violation of Belgian sovereignty, Baker agreed with Wilson's declaration of neutrality on August 19, 1914. He admired German culture deeply, had used German examples for his model suburb in Cleveland, and recognized "the splendid effi ciency . . . with which the Germans have worked out their social and municipal relations." His dislike of militarism, he told the Austro-Hungarian consul in Cleveland in March 1915, extended equally to Germany's army and Britain's navy.
Baker had other reasons to resile from the war. He had been a fervent supporter, and was later a member, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration created by the Hague Conference of 1899, was a leader of the Ohio branch of the World Peace Foundation, and had been elected vice president of the Cleveland Peace Society only a month before Eu rope went to war. Baker's pacifi sm was later much discussed and exaggerated. He was never opposed to all wars on principle, but was instead an antimilitarist who objected to wars fought without sustained attempts at diplomatic resolution. As the Eu ro pe an war dragged on, Baker refused to join other peace organizations. By then he had decided that "the administration in Washington ought to have the united support of thoughtful people in the country and that our strength ought not to be divided up into a number of societies with special points of view." 43 Conditions closer to home also kept Baker neutral. As mayor of Cleveland he presided over a polyglot population including 80,000 Germans and many Russians, Irish, and Britons. After hearing that war had broken out, Baker summoned his chief of police to warn him that "we are likely to have the war in miniature in our streets." The chief was less alarmed, correctly predicting that arrests stemming from christenings would outnumber those arising from ethnic confl ict. At the end of 1915 Baker admitted that his fears had been unfounded and declared that he now had complete faith in the patriotism of America's foreign-born citizens in general and its Germans in par tic u lar. It was propaganda from Eu rope, and not tensions at home, that threatened peace on the streets of Cleveland.
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Baker followed Wilson's lead as the war drew closer. He praised the president's response to the sinking of the Lusitania, which cost 128 American lives in May 1915, because "America's policy can be made one of focusing the disapproval of the neutral world upon [Germany's] course rather than a voluntary recourse to arms by the United States." He told another correspondent that "sometimes it is necessary to tie up a bad dog and not merely frown at him, so that I am for [Wilson's] conclusion what ever it is." Soon after the Lusitania crisis Wilson announced a policy of "preparedness" to build up the military resources of the United States. This placed Baker, who much preferred the "high plane of idealism" than the prospect of a heavily armed America, in a quandary. He supported preparedness loyally, but with more resignation than enthusiasm. America needed arms in a world at war, he conceded, but soon humanity would return to its senses and forswear the militarism that had brought about war and that threatened to drag the United States into its vortex. 45 By the beginning of 1916 Baker had moved signifi cantly from his earlier view that "I am the most neutral person I know." As he had once found equal fault on both sides, he now emphasized German brutality and disregard for international law over the infractions of the British and argued that "Germany intended this war, prepared for it and began it." By its actions in Belgium and through its U-Boats on the high seas Germany had become an outlaw nation that posed a mortal threat to international decency and order. Baker was not yet ready to advocate US intervention in the war, but by January 1916-two months before he became secretary of war-he had decided the merits of the Allies' and the Central Powers' causes.
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In an attempt to rekindle idealism amid the orgy of profi t that neutrality brought to the United States, Baker suggested a salve for the nation's conscience. Public opinion was changing, he told Wilson in the middle of December 1915, toward those who believed that America should "insist vigorously upon the maintenance of neutral rights, backing up our insistence with force, if necessary." The nation now suffered from "the moral strain of getting rich at the expense of the rest of the world," and this threatened a "depression of our national conscience" and "an enfeebling materialism." It was vital that the world should see the United States as more than a carrion bird growing fat on war profi ts:
In other words America must, at the conclusion of the war, give until it hurts.
Our giving ought to be directed to sustaining . . . belligerent countries until they can plant and gather their fi rst crops and get their industries or ga nized to the point of production and return. Much of this giving undoubtedly ought to be from those individuals who have most profi ted by the situation, but a great national gift distributed through some internationally recognized agency . . . would preach the sermon to our own people more impressively and also put us in a better light to the Eu ro pe an peoples whose cooperation . . . we must win to the ideal of future peace. 47 By this time Baker had decided not to seek a third term as mayor and to return to his legal career. Although disappointed that his po liti cal heir Peter Witt did not win the mayoralty in November 1915, Baker handed the offi ce over to Harry Davis on January 1, 1916, with little regret and immediately formed a law fi rm with Joseph Hostetler and Thomas Sidlo, two former members of the Cleveland Law Department. "Personally, I am very sorry to see you retiring from public life," Wilson wrote from Washington. "I think the whole country has learned to trust you. No doubt your instinct about getting an outside view again is a correct one, but I hope that after you have got it you will come into the ranks again." 48 The call came much sooner than even Wilson had imagined. In Washington the secretary of war, Lindley Garrison, was in deep po liti cal trouble early in 1916. Appointed in 1913, Garrison had been an outspoken secretary of war: he opposed Philippine in de pen dence, advocated invasion of Mexico, and urged war against Germany after the sinking of the Lusitania. He was an earnest supporter of preparedness and believed strongly in Universal Military Training (UMT) to build up the US Army. A lawyer, but a much more conservative one than Baker, Garrison had no military experience and followed advice from the army without question. What he lacked in military knowledge he made up for in assertiveness; Garrison was imperious in his treatment of Congress, its House Military Affairs Committee, and its powerful chairman James Hay, and was argumentative in the cabinet. His nickname there, according to McAdoo, was "Secretary Garrulous." Uncompromising in his support of UMT, Garrison felt betrayed when Wilson disavowed it to placate anti-preparedness Demo crats led by William Jennings Bryan. He resigned on February 10, 1916, to public congressional delight and private presidential relief. 49 The press reported that Secretary of Interior Franklin Lane or Secretary of Agriculture David Houston would replace Garrison, and that Baker would replace whoever moved. Major General George Goethals, then governor of the Panama Canal Zone, was also mentioned as a possible replacement. This seemed plausible; with the nation perched on the edge of world war and with preparedness underway, a military man seemed necessary to oversee the army. Baker, on the other hand, was unqualifi ed for that task; he was widely known as a pacifi st and in 1914 had professed "utter non-comprehension of military matters." Yet he had other, more powerful claims to offi ce. Wilson resisted the idea of having a soldier in the cabinet and wanted to avoid a reshuffl e of Lane's or Houston's portfolio. He had already offered Baker a cabinet post-Interior, in 1913-and thought highly of the mayor from Cleveland who had fought so valiantly for him in 1912. After discussions with House and McAdoo, he decided on Baker and asked McAdoo to make the call to Cleveland.
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News of Baker's appointment elicited reactions ranging from mea sured praise to outright disdain. The New York Times reminded its readers that he was not the fi rst secretary of war to be appointed without knowledge of military affairs, but elsewhere in its columns ran stories about Baker's pacifi sm and his recent conversion to preparedness. "Can we expect energetic action and sustained interest in this most vital problem now before the American people," asked the secretary of the National Security League, "from a person of such a decidedly pacifi st tendency?" In Britain George Riddell, own er of The News of the World, dismissed Baker as a "nice, trim little man of the YMCA type," and in Washington Major General Leonard Wood found the thought of a pacifi st leading the army during a world war "too grotesque." Wood's troubles with Baker were just beginning, and Baker was soon to test his belief that "the problems of democracy have to be worked out in experiment stations rather than by universal applications, so that I regard Cleveland and Ohio as a more hopeful place to do things than in any national station whatsoever." Naturally sociable and now in the public eye, Mac was led by his ambitions farther and farther from home after 1910. He was a convivial dinner companion, danced well, and liked driving cars. Automobiles were expensive playthings in the fi rst de cade of the twentieth century, but Mac was drawn to their speed and the freedom they provided from the pressures of work and home. In 1911 he owned three cars-a 1906 Mercedes, an Alco, and a Stearns-and retained a chauffeur. He also liked to drive himself, but not always to good effect. His papers are littered with letters to insurance companies explaining a succession of accidents for which he blamed everyone and everything except himself.
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On May 18, 1911, McAdoo's love of cars and socializing combined to injure him severely and nearly enmesh him in scandal. In 1910 he became a director of the Tuberculosis Preventorium for Children in Lakewood, New Jersey. The Preventorium had an impressive list of New Yorkers on its board, including the heiress Florence Jaffray Harriman. Harriman and Mac drove together in May 1911 to a board meeting in Lakewood, with Mac at the wheel. On the way home, near Freehold, New Jersey, their car ran off the road and rolled over. McAdoo claimed that roadwork, which left the road muddy and corrugated, was to blame. He and Harriman were thrown from the car; she was only slightly hurt, but he was thrown twenty feet, landed on his head, and was unconscious for two hours. He suffered three broken ribs, a fractured right arm, and cuts to his scalp that put him in hospital for two weeks, confi ned him at home for another six, and took his arm years to recover. "I consider myself," he wrote to his brother-in-law, "a lucky dev il."
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The accident presented McAdoo with more than medical complications. It also threatened scandal, for the newspapers were unlikely to ignore the fact that a prominent New Yorker, who was also a married woman, was in the car. To head off any rumors McAdoo announced that he and Mrs. Harriman were on offi cial business in Lakewood and that her husband J. Borden had approved of their traveling together. Mac was relieved when the press chose not to explore this aspect of the story further, for there was more to it than fi rst appeared. More than con ve nience had brought Mac and Mrs. Harriman together; by then they were involved in a passionate affair. In 1911 McAdoo was 48, married to an invalid, and fêted in New York society. Florence Harriman was 41 and little constrained by her marriage to "Bordie" Harriman. She lived life to the full; even in 1927, when she was 57, a magazine called her "incorrigibly young." 
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In 1911 McAdoo was also in the midst of a re orientation of his po liti cal loyalties. Although he later maintained that he had been a lifelong Demo crat who had deserted the party only once, this was a considerable understatement. He had voted Republican in 1904 because the Demo cratic presidential nominee, Alton B. Parker, was "a thoroughgoing reactionary," while his Republican opponent Theodore Roo se velt was "a real progressive." But he had also voted for the Gold Demo crats against William Jennings Bryan in 1896, and his allegiance to TR was deep in 1904. "I am a Southern Demo crat, who was fi rst seduced from his party allegiances by Theodore Roo se velt, the Republican candidate for Governor of the State of New York [in 1898]," McAdoo told TR in 1903. He praised Roo se velt's Panama policy and thought that he would have been justifi ed in "forcibly bringing Panama under our sovereignty." Despite Demo cratic carping McAdoo felt sure that TR could rely "on the great masses of the people of this country [to] follow you wherever you carry the fl ag and that they will not be infl uenced by the over-refi ned hypercritics who spend their time as common-scolds in a hopeless fi ght against the resistless progress of manifest destiny."
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McAdoo and Roo se velt exchanged friendly letters over the next seven years. During the campaign of 1904 McAdoo wrote that "I am anxious that you should know personally the deep interest I feel in your election," and that "I do not believe that the Democracy should again be entrusted with power until it has . . . committed itself beyond doubt to the maintenance of the gold standard." Bryan had prevented the party from making that commitment in 1904, and he remained a threat to good government and sound currency. Roo se velt, on the other hand, was a man of "undaunted physical and moral courage, of uncompromising honesty, of high ideals and the loftiest conceptions of the duties of his exalted offi ce." After TR's election in 1904 McAdoo hinted that he would accept appointment to the Panama Canal Commission, not only because of his deep interest in the canal's success but also because of "my loyalty to and support of your administration." Roo se velt had already promised the place, but the two men stayed friendly. TR opened the Hudson tunnels in 1908, and even in 1911, as McAdoo joined Woodrow Wilson's Democratic nomination campaign, he sent TR copies of his speeches and lunched with him at Oyster Bay.
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McAdoo's return to the Demo cratic fold was caused by several factors. His admiration for TR was motivated by his belief that the Demo cratic Party was unelectable so long as it nominated soft money populists like William Jennings Bryan or irredeemable conservatives such as Alton Parker. TR's forceful personality and conviction that the federal government needed to embrace the modern industrial age struck a chord in McAdoo, but when he left the White House in 1909 the chief cause of McAdoo's dalliance with the GOP disappeared.
There were ideological reasons as well. As McAdoo became more interested in politics, he grew convinced that untrammeled corporate power, called at the time the "trust problem," was the key issue of the age. Thus far he was in sympathy with TR, but McAdoo diverged from Roo se velt in his preferred solution. While Roo sevelt wanted to regulate trusts instead of breaking them up, McAdoo thought that they should be split into smaller and less dominant entities. In this he parted company with TR's ideas that crystallized into his "New Nationalism" in 1912. Trusts, McAdoo argued in the middle of 1911, were or ga nized to promote the greed of their own ers and to crush their competitors. Only "the healthful stimulus of competition" would control them.
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As he drew closer to national politics McAdoo's ambition brought him back to the Demo crats. As a self-conscious southerner, he had brighter po liti cal prospects within the party that dominated the Old Confederacy. "The South is rapidly regaining the potential infl uence in the po liti cal affairs of the country which she exercised prior to the Civil War," he told the Southern Commercial Congress in February 1911, and he was determined to be part of that revival. As a prominent business fi gure born in the South but successful in New York, McAdoo was well placed to be part of a new Demo cratic Party that sought to present a more business-friendly and cross-sectional appeal to voters. His record as a socially engaged business leader also made him attractive as a Demo crat attuned to progressive reform and ready to bring his business experience into the po liti cal arena. His confi dant Byron Newton said as much at the end of 1909. The new age of progressive politics, Newton told Mac, "was a game of politics with the politicians left out." Instead, businessmen and reformers could combine to reform the Demo cratic Party and provide new leadership to public policy and governance. "The continued glory and welfare of this headstrong country of ours depends upon strong men . . . going into the game." There is no evidence to suggest that McAdoo chose Wilson with any doctrinaire notions of progressivism in mind. Unlike Baker, he approached politics from a pragmatic perspective. It was the practice, not the theory, of power and reform that appealed to him most. As McAdoo had supported Theodore Roo se velt as a leader who promised conviction and action, so too did he gravitate toward Wilson as the Demo crat best attuned to the necessities of the time. At the beginning of 1910, with TR out of the White House, he concluded that
The more I refl ect on existing conditions and problems, and the more speeches I hear of the average politician and alleged statesman, the more I am convinced that there are very few . . . who have correctly sensed the deep underlying feelings and aspirations of the masses of the people. We are working, undoubtedly, toward a broader and nobler humanitarianism, and some day a real leader, hav-ing in his heart that breadth of human sympathy which will make him capable of truly interpreting the tendencies of the day will crystallize them and give struggling humanity a genuine up-lift.
62
Yet Wilson was no Theodore Roo se velt in his ability to connect to the "deep underlying feelings and aspirations of the masses of the people." Wilson and TR were very different in personality and approach. Roo se velt was warm and charismatic; Wilson was distant from the human imperatives of elective politics and even his friends thought that his aloofness was his greatest electoral liability. Yet McAdoo stressed Wilson's electability as his most important attraction. His descriptions were vague on Wilson's views and focused instead on his "strength" and conviction: "I know him to be not only a great man, but a clean man and a free man, and that, if he is elected, the country will have an absolutely clean, irreproachable and able administration. I believe, furthermore, that he is the only Demo crat who can be elected." McAdoo's politics were those of ambition rather than ideology; he sought po liti cal infl uence and offi ce to achieve concrete policy rather than serve a cause. At fi rst TR offered that pathway, but now it was clear to McAdoo that the Demo crats promised the surer way forward. Wilson seemed to McAdoo to be the Demo crat most likely to win in 1912, and so he hitched his wagon to his star. The triumph at Baltimore did nothing to improve relations within the Wilson campaign. Despite his manifest unsuitability for the job, McCombs pushed hard to be appointed chairman of the DNC and head of Wilson's election campaign. He even engineered a torrent of tele grams, allegedly from Demo crats across the nation but actually from McComb's friends, that urged his appointment. Already sensitive about his reputation for ingratitude, and anxious to avoid dissention in his camp, Wilson agreed. He then tested his new friendship with McAdoo by asking him to become McComb's deputy. "You are the only man living for whom I would accept this post," McAdoo replied. "If I do less well than you expect, only remember that I am not in command and that that necessarily restricts opportunity." Rarely was a more volatile combination created; McCombs was sick, unstable, and hypersensitive, while his deputy was dynamic and tactless. Not surprisingly, their duet functioned only when they worked apart.
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Fortunately for Wilson, McCombs's poor health kept him away from Wilson's headquarters for much of the campaign. His rages at McAdoo worsened as his mental equilibrium deteriorated, and McAdoo found himself in a deputy's nightmare as his decisions during McCombs's absences were revoked as soon as the chairman returned to the offi ce. In the middle of August, as the campaign entered its critical phase, McCombs's mental and physical health collapsed and he was sent home for two months' rest. After recalling Byron Newton, McAdoo concentrated on bringing order to the campaign's fi nancial affairs by instituting clear accounting methods and demanding costings for all expenditures. He called this the application of business principles to politics, but it was also a desperate effort to bring order to a campaign that had drifted dangerously because of McCombs's eccentricities.
77
McCombs returned from his sickbed in the middle of October to accuse McAdoo of risking Wilson's reformist reputation by soliciting funds from Wall Street. Telling the press that he had been forced to foil the plot and avoid "a great scandal," McCombs stamped his authority on the last days of Wilson's campaign. McAdoo's preparations for a Wilson and Marshall Day celebration on November 2 were upended; his name was excised from publicity materials and substituted with McCombs's, and 100,000 copies of a letter to voters signed by McAdoo were destroyed. McAdoo left headquarters and returned to H&M, but not before writing to McCombs that he had tolerated enough of his insults and megalomania. "I will pull as hard with you as any man can for success," he declared, "but there is a certain respect and consideration which is not only indispensable, but which must not be ignored." From then on he only appeared when McCombs was out of the offi ce.
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Wilson's victory on November 5, 1912, turned attention to the composition of his cabinet. The press was sure that McAdoo would become secretary of the treasury; his status as Wilson's best known supporter from New York and his prominent role in the campaign made him the obvious choice. Well before the election Wilson had discussed with Col o nel House the advisability of appointing McAdoo to Trea sury, and his admiration for his de facto campaign manager only increased as McCombs grew more erratic. Wilson acknowledged to McAdoo "the generous and effi cient part, the self-sacrifi cing and sometimes painful part, you have played in pushing forward the common cause," and told him that he would not forget his role in the victory. As for McCombs, Wilson had heard and seen enough to convince him that he should not be appointed to the cabinet. An ambassadorship would be gratitude enough, with the added advantage that it would send McCombs abroad and prevent further embarrassment. McCombs was duly offered the ambassadorship to France, which he refused as an expensive exile. With his po liti cal debt to McCombs paid, Wilson's tone toward him changed from gratitude to imperiousness. "Whether you did little or much, remember that God ordained that I should be the next President of the United States. Neither you nor any other mortal or mortals could have prevented it."
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McCombs had other ideas. On the basis of his experience as a New York lawyer, his success at fundraising, and his titular leadership of the election campaign, he considered himself eminently suitable for Trea sury. Rightly judging McAdoo to be his chief rival for that post, he enlisted his friends to persuade Wilson that McAdoo could not be trusted to be a force for progressive reform and would instead be a tool of Wall Street. This was ironic, for although McAdoo had raised millions of dollars from Wall Street to fi nance the H&M, he was neither its darling nor its champion and distrusted it all his adult life. Oswald Garrison Villard, editorial writer of The Nation and a leader of progressive opinion, threw his weight behind McCombs's claim to be secretary of trea sury by damning McAdoo as "one of the least valuable of Wilson's advisers on questions of policy for his advice was rarely actuated by principle, usually by po liti cal intuition." McCombs, in contrast, was a sincere and determined progressive, loyal to Wilson through conviction rather than ambition. 
